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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 
v. : 
GREGORY J. MARSHALL, : Category No. 13 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded 
that State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), overruled the 
prior decisions of this Court in State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 
(Utah 1987), State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1986), and State 
v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984). 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded 
that State v. Schlosser precludes an appellee from raising standing 
for the first time on appeal as an alternative ground for affirming 
the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress? 
3. Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals 
represents a minority view inconsistent with the majority of 
federal and Utah case law? 
4. Whether the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded 
that the trial court's finding on consent to search was 
insufficient and erroneously concluded that consent must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence? 
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion below is the amended opinion of the Utah 
Court of Appeals issued on April 18, 1990, in State v. Marshall, 
No* 890121-CA (see Addendum A for the text of the decision). 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
This is a petition for writ of certiorari to the Utah 
Court of Appeals which reversed the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence and which remanded the 
matter to the district court for further evidentiary hearing. An 
opinion was originally entered in this case on December 26, 1989 
(see Addendum B for the text of the decision). The State 
petitioned for rehearing which was granted. On April 18r 1990, an 
amended opinion was filed by the Court of Appeals (Addendum A). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this petition pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1989) and § 78-2a-4 (1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of any provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Gregory J. Marshall, was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1990) (R. 2). 
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the marijuana (R. 23-24). 
The motion was denied (R. 54-55). Defendant filed an interlocutory 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals (R. 91, 187). 
On December 26, 1989, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court's denial of the motion to suppress on the basis that 
*Mr. Marshall did not consent-in-fact to the search of the locked 
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suitcases found in the trunk of his vehicle" (footnote omitted) 
(Addendum B, Slip op. at 15). The State petitioned for rehearing. 
On April 18, 1990, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for 
rehearing by issuing an amended opinion. The amended opinion 
reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress but 
remanded the case for rehearing "on the limited issues of whether 
Mr. Marshall voluntarily consented to the search of the trunk or 
the suitcases, whether Mr. Marshall abandoned any privacy interest 
in the suitcases and thus lacks standing to challenge their search, 
and finally, if the trial court finds there was an illegal search 
of the truck or suitcases, whether there is a sufficient nexus 
between that illegal search and Mr. Marshall's abandonment, if any, 
of his expectation of privacy in the suitcases" (Addendum A, 
Amended slip op. at 17). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 25, 1988, at approximately 9:15 a.m., Utah 
Highway Patrol Trooper Denis Avery was on routine patrol on S.R. 70 
near Salina, Sevier County, Utah (Tl. 4; T2. 3, 5). As Trooper 
Avery was turning over the median to continue his patrol, he 
noticed defendant's vehicle in the left hand lane passing a motor 
home (Tl. 4, 8; T2. 7-8). Defendant's vehicle was not speeding or 
passing improperly and the trooper did not pursue the vehicle (T2. 
7). After the trooper completed his turn, the trooper could 
observe that the turn signal of defendant's vehicle had remained 
blinking (T2. 8). For approximately two more miles, defendant 
The preliminary hearing transcript will be referred to as (T2.), 
the deposition transcript as (DT.) and the suppression hearing 
transcript as (Tl.). Reference will only be to the suppression 
transcript (Tl.) except as otherwise appropriate. 
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failed to cancel his signal light (T2. 9). Not knowing whether 
there was a mechanical problem or defendant had negligently left 
the turn signal on, the trooper pulled the vehicle over to inform 
defendant of the problem and issue a warning ticket (Tl. 8, 9; DT. 
15, 20). Trooper Avery had followed this same procedure in 
observing other vehicles having a continuous turn signal (DT, 16; 
T2. 13). 
Prior to stopping defendant, Trooper Avery had noticed 
that the vehicle had California license plates (Tl. 10). He did 
not see how many individuals were in the vehicle or notice anything 
about any individual (DT. 23, 24). He had no opinion as to the 
race of any occupant of the vehicle prior to the stop; and, was not 
of the belief that the race of a defendant is relevant to any 
determination of involvement in criminal activity (DT. 23, 31). In 
fact, defendant in this case is a fair-skinned Caucasian (DT. 22). 
The trooper did not call his dispatcher to tell her that he was 
pulling the car over or request any backup assistance (DT. 17). He 
did not because his only intention in stopping defendant was to 
inform defendant of the equipment problem and issue a warning 
citation (Tl. 8, 19; DT. 15,20). 
Consistent with this purpose, Trooper Avery approached 
defendant while defendant was in his vehicle (Tl. 12). When the 
trooper informed defendant of the signal light problem, defendant 
responded that he had been having "a hard time keeping that thing 
turned off" (Tl. 12; DT. 17). The trooper asked defendant to 
identify himself and provide his driver's license and vehicle 
registration (T2. 12). Defendant supplied the trooper with a New 
York license and a California rental agreement for the vehicle (T2. 
12; DT. Exh. 1, Incident Report). Defendant stated that he was 
going to Colorado to ski and would be returning the vehicle to San 
Diego, California (Tl. 15). This was inconsistent with the rental 
contract which indicated that the car was to be returned to New 
York within four days (Tl. 15). 
Defendant and Trooper Avery went to the trooper's car so 
that the trooper could issue the warning citation for the turn 
signal (Tl. 17). After issuing the citation, the trooper returned 
to defendant his driver's license, rental agreement and the warning 
citation (Tl. 21). 
The trooper asked defendant if he could look inside the 
vehicle (Tl. 5, 22; T2. 18). Defendant responded "Go ahead" (Tl. 
5, 22; T2. 18). Trooper Avery and defendant walked back to 
defendant's vehicle. The passenger door was locked, but defendant 
reached in on the driver's side and opened the door (Tl. 24-5). A 
small red bag was on the floor of the vehicle. Trooper Avery asked 
if he could open it and defendant agreed (Tl. 25). No contraband 
was found in the interior of the car (Tl. 25-6). Trooper Avery 
then asked if defendant had the key to the trunk and if defendant 
would open the trunk (Tl. 27; DT. 55). Defendant got the key and 
began opening the trunk. At this point, defendant started shaking 
so badly that the trooper had to hold up the latch cover so 
defendant could insert the key (Tl. 31; T2. 20). Trooper Avery's 
practice is to always have the driver open the trunk, "Just so 
that, you know, if he has any objections, he's right there. I 
don't have the keys. He's got the keys himself. He's free to 
go — there's no coercion factor" (T2. 56). 
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Upon opening the trunk, four padlocked suitcases were 
visible. The trooper asked defendant what was in the cases; 
defendant responded "clothes" (Tl. 28). Trooper Avery asked if he 
could look inside the bags and defendant responded that the 
suitcases were not his and must have already been in the vehicle 
when he rented it (Tl. 28; DT. 57). After unzipping one bag a few 
inches and determining that it contained marijuana, the trooper 
seized the suitcases and arrested defendant for felony possession 
of marijuana (Tl. 28, 30). 
Defendant did not testify or present any evidence in 
contradiction of the trooper's testimony in the trial court. 
Instead, defendant argued that the stop of his rental vehicle for a 
failed turn signal was pretextual and that the subsequent consents 
to search the vehicle and trunk were involuntary due to the 
coercive influence of an unlawful detention (R. 56-87, 93-125; Tl. 
32-36; Br. of App., Points I, II and III). 
The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress, 
concluding: 
1. The stop of the vehicle was legal based on 
the Officer's perceived vehicle safety problems 
of a broken turn signal or driver's negligence. 
2. The Officer had a right to give a warning 
ticket and to obtain information on the driver 
and ownership of the vehicle. 
3. The investigation was reasonable by the 
Officer in view of the Defendant's statements 
in regards to the vehicle ownership and the 
driver's usage. The destination itinerary 
would have put a reasonable Officer on notice 
that something was wrong. 
4. The Defendant consented to the search. 
There was no evidence of duress or coercion. 
(R. 54-55, 89-90). 
Both below and on appeal, defendant did not challenge the 
search of the suitcases except as derivative of what he claimed was 
an impermissible stop and detention. The Court of Appeals 
initially concluded that the issue of the search of the suitcases 
had been raised below by defendant (Slip op. at 9). On rehearing, 
the Court re-examined the record and concluded that the State was 
correct in asserting that defendant failed to raise this issue 
below (Amended slip op. at 12). 
On appeal, the State asserted, as an additional ground 
for affirmance of the lower court's denial of the motion to 
suppress, that defendant lacked standing to challenge the search 
and seizure of the suitcases. The State did not challenge 
defendant's standing to object to the stop or search of the vehicle 
generally (Br. of Resp. at 7-9). Instead, it was argued that 
defendant's disclaimer of ownership was not only sufficient to 
negate his standing to challenge the search and seizure of the 
suitcases, but also validated the reasonableness of the police 
action in that defendant had abandoned any privacy interest in that 
property (Br. of Resp. at 8). The issue of standing only needed to 
be considered by the appellate court if the search could not 
otherwise be sustained and defendant was not viewed as having 
waived any challenge as to the suitcases. 
Instead, the Court of Appeals concluded that the State 
was precluded from raising standing on appeal as an alternative 
ground for affirmance. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held 
that State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), established a 
new standing rule which superseded and overruled this Court's prior 
decisions in State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987), State 
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v, Iaconof 725 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1986), and State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 
1334 (Utah 1984) (Amended slip op. at 9 n.6). Further, the court 
concluded that while the stop and detention of defendant were 
constitutionally valid, the trial court's finding of consent was 
ambiguous and insufficient (Amended slip op. at 14). Therefore, 
the court remanded the case to the district court for rehearing on 
the limited issues of consent and abandonment (disclaimer) (Amended 
slip op. at 17). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT 
STATE V. SCHLOSSER OVERRULED PRIOR UTAH CASE 
LAW. 
In rendering its amended opinion in State v. Marshall, 
the Court of Appeals concluded that the State, as appellee, is 
precluded from raising a defendant's lack of standing for the first 
time on appeal, even if only raised as an alternative ground for 
affirmance of the lower court's denial of defendant's motion to 
suppress. The appellate court held that this Court's decision in 
State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), bars the raising of 
a "substantive issue or 'claim of error'" for the first time on 
appeal (Amended slip op. at 9). Specifically, the appellate court 
rejected the State's argument that Schlosser's dictum concerning 
standing was limited solely to the raising of new claims of errors, 
and not the raising of substantive issues by an appellee to affirm 
a ruling. Id. The failure of the Court of Appeals to properly 
interpret and apply State v. Schlosser lies as the false predicate 
of its opinion. 
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The full scope of the error of the Court of Appeals' 
decision can best be seen by its conclusion that this Court 
superseded and overruled existing precedent in rendering its 
decision in State v. Schlosser. Reviewing State v. Constantinof 
732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987), State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375 (Utah 
1986), and State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d. 1334 (Utah 1984), the Court 
of Appeals concluded: 
Prior to Schlosser, the Utah Supreme Court had, 
in several cases, considered standing for the 
first time on appeal and had utilized the 
doctrine to refuse to consider the 
constitutional validity of a challenged search. 
. . . In these earlier cases, it is sometimes 
unclear whether the Utah Supreme Court raised 
the issue of standing sua sponte on appeal or 
permitted the state to raise the issue of 
standing for the first time on appeal. We 
assume Schlosser supersedes these earlier cases 
and thus do not follow them. 
(Amended slip op. at 9 n.6). 
There is nothing in the language of Schlosser to support 
such a conclusion. This Court did not hold that an appellee is 
barred from raising standing on appeal. Rather, in dictum, it 
concluded that under the facts of the case, the State, as 
appellant, had waived any challenge to the defendant's standing 
such that the issue was not properly before the Court. Schlosser, 
774 P.2d at 1139. Accord United States v. Wanless, 882 F.2d 1459, 
1462-63 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989) (must distinguish between state 
permissibly raising standing for the first time on appeal and state 
totally waiving issue by never raising below or on appeal). 
Nothing in either the majority or dissenting opinions of 
Schlosser indicates that this Court was "superseding" any prior 
Utah case law. Instead, the disagreement between members of the 
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Court appeared to be centered on the issue of whether, despite the 
State's waiver of the standing issue, this Court would sua sponte 
address it. The majority opted not to, as "it has not been raised 
by the parties, either here or in the court below." 774 P.2d at 
1139. While the dissenting members of the Court may have viewed 
this as factually inconsistent with prior decisions, there was 
nothing legally inconsistent with the majority's conclusion. See, 
e.g., State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Utah 1989), cert. 
denied 110 S.Ct. 1323 (Mar. 5f 1990); Society of Prof. Journalists, 
Utah Chapter v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Constantino, 732 P.2d at 126-27; Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State 
Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798 (Utah 1986); Utah Restaurant 
Assn. v. Davis County Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1160 (Utah 
1985); and State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d at 1335 (all cases where this 
Court sua sponte considered standing for the first time on appeal). 
Accord State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775, 777 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Compare State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d at 1377-78 (where this Court 
allowed the State, as appellee, to raise standing for the* first 
time on appeal, and on that ground affirmed, while rejecting the 
lower court's finding of consent). 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT 
STATE V. SCHLOSSER PRECLUDES AN APPELLEE FROM 
RAISING STANDING FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
AS AN ALTERNATIVE GROUND FOR AFFIRMING A LOWER 
COURT'S RULING. 
In concluding that the State had waived the issue of 
standing in Schlosser, this Court did not create new law but simply 
applied the general rule that a new claim of error should not be 
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considered for the first time on appeal. Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 
1138. But, the Court of Appeals expanded this conclusion by ruling 
that the general rule governing claims of errors also precludes the 
raising of any alternative ground for affirmance of the lower 
court's ruling (Amended slip op. at 9). 
The only authority citation for the appellate court's 
proposition is this Court's citing of State v. Goodman, 42 Wash. 
App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057 (1985), in Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1139 
(Amended slip op. at 9-10 n.7). While it is true that Goodman made 
the general statement that the government is precluded from raising 
standing for the first time on appeal, the Court of Appeals ignored 
a significant difference in Goodman's applicability to Utah. 
Washington is an automatic standing state. Goodman, 711 P.2d at 
1060. As such, a defendant charged with a possessory crime will be 
presumed to have standing unless challenged by the state. Id. 
This is directly contrary to Utah and federal case law 
which impose an obligation of factual proof of standing on the 
defendant. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92 (1980) 
(overruling automatic standing rule of Jones v. United States, 362 
U.S. 257 (I960)); Society of Prof. Journalists v. Bullock, 743 U.S. 
at 1171; State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d at 1335; State v. Webb, 131 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 41, 49 (Utah Ct. App. March 26, 1990). 
Other courts have allowed the State, even as an appellant, to 
raise standing for the first time on appeal. See United States v. 
McBean, 861 F.2d 1570, 1573 (11th Cir. 1988) (despite government 
concession on standing below, standing allowed to be raised for the 
first time on appeal even though government was appellant); United 
States v. Hansen, 652 F.2d 1374, 1381-83 (10th Cir. 1981) 
(government, as appellant, allowed to raise on appeal since 
defendant bears burden of establishing standing). 
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In Goodman, the Washington appellate court relied on an 
earlier Washington decision, State v. Grundy, 25 Wash.App. 411, 607 
P.2d 1235 (1980), which was also cited by this Court in Schlosser, 
774 P.2d at 1139. Consistent with the State's position in the 
present case, the Grundy court refused to allow the state, as 
appellant, to raise standing for the first time on appeal, Grundy, 
607 P.2d at 1237. The Washington court recognized that two rules 
apply depending on whether a new issue is raised on appeal by the 
appellant or the appellee. Since the general rule is that errors 
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, an appellant is 
generally viewed as having waived any error not raised in the court 
below. However, an appellee may be heard for the first time on 
appeal since it is "the duty of an appellate court to affirm upon 
any ground supported by the record, even if not the ground utilized 
by the trial court." Id. Accord State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 
(Utah 1985) . 
The third case cited by this Court in Schlosser is also 
inconsistent with the Court of Appeals' decision. Brown v. United 
States, 411 U.S. 223, 230 n.4 (1973), held that where there was no 
evidence in the trial court that the defendants had either a 
possessory or propriety interest in the property seized, it was 
inappropriate for the defendants to assert that they had 
"constructive possession" in an attempt to invoke the then existing 
automatic standing rule for the first time on appeal. 
There is no support for the Court of Appeals' conclusion 
that: 
the Schlosser standing rule was fashioned to 
protect the defendant from being required to 
deal with new legal issues on appeal when he 
-12-
had no warning of the necessity to develop the 
relevant facts below. 
(Amended slip op. at 12). The opposite is true. It is the 
appellee which is to be protected from having new claims of error 
considered for the first time on appeal. As will be discussed 
below, such a position is consistent with the view of the majority 
of courts. 
POINT III 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' CONCLUSION THAT THE STATE 
IS PRECLUDED FROM RAISING A DEFENDANT'S LACK OF 
STANDING FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL IS 
CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED LAW. 
Utah and federal case law recognize that it is the 
defendant's burden to establish that "his own Fourth Amendment 
rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure." Rakas 
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 131 n.l (1978); State v. Valdez, 689 
P.2d at 1335). Accord State v. Webb, 131 Utah Adv. Rep at 49; 
State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Even a 
defendant charged with a possessory crime is no longer presumed to 
have standing, for mere physical possession of seized property 
cannot "substitute for a factual finding that the owner of the good 
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched." 
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 92. Accord State v. Valdez, 
689 P.2d at 1335. 
Despite the general acceptance of defendant's affirmative 
duty to establish standing, the Court of Appeals applied an 
automatic standing standard in characterizing the State's challenge 
to standing as an affirmative defense which must be raised below or 
is waived (Amended slip op. at 11). 
-13-
Beginning with Rakas v. Illinois/ the United States 
Supreme Court has concluded that analytically standing is no more 
than "a determination of whether the disputed search and seizure 
has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth 
Amendment was designed to protect." 439 U.S. at 141. Rejecting 
the previous automatic standing rule, the Supreme Court now refuses 
to "use possession of a seized good as a substitute for a factual 
finding that the owner of the good had a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the area searched." United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 
at 92. Accord California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212 (1986). 
Here, defendant failed to present any evidence during the 
suppression hearing to controvert the officer's testimony that 
defendant disclaimed ownership in the property prior to the 
officer's search and seizure (Tl. 28; DT. 57). As such, defendant 
failed to establish his standing as to the property searched and 
seized. State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334; State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 
194; State v. Schneider, 51 Or. App. 161, 625 P.2d 150 (1981). 
The Court of Appeals excuses defendant's failure to 
assert standing below by constructing a new rule. 
[T]he prosecutor, as part of the state's burden 
to establish the constitutionality of a 
warrantless search, must give a defendant 
"notice that he will be put to his proof" on 
the issue of fourth amendment standing. This 
can be done at any time during the hearing on a 
defendant's motion to suppress as long as the 
defendant has an opportunity to put on evidence 
to meet the claim. Once the defendant has been 
put on notice that the state claims the 
warrantless search was constitutional because 
he has no expectation of privacy in the area 
searched, then the defendant must factually 
demonstrate that he does have standing to 
contest the warrantless search. 
(Amended slip. op. at 11-12) (footnote omitted). 
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This conclusion ignores the facts of the case. The State 
has never challenged defendant's standing as it relates generally 
to the search of the vehicle. Clearly, defendant, pursuant to a 
valid rental agreement and as the legitimate driver of the vehicle, 
had standing to contest the stop and search of the car. But since 
defendant never raised any issue below as to the search of the 
suitcases, the State had no necessity to challenge his standing as 
it relates to his disclaimer. Even the Court of Appeals recognized 
defendant's waiver of any challenge to this aspect of the search 
(Amended slip op. at 12). Accord State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d at 
126; State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985); State v. Webb, 
131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 49. 
More significantly, the new rule imposed by the Court of 
Appeals misconstrues the concept of standing altogether. A 
defendant's lack of standing cannot make an otherwise 
unconstitutional search, constitutional. Utilizing the concept of 
a legitimate expectation of privacy, standing has merged with other 
substantive fourth amendment inquiries. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 
U.S. at 138-139; State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1138; State v. 
Greuber, 776 P.2d 70, 73 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 
(Utah 1989). But, there still exists, 
two analytically distinct but "invariably 
intertwined" issues of substantive Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. . . . The first is 
"whether a disputed search or seizure has 
infringed an interest of the defendant which 
the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect," 
. . . the second is whether "the challenged 
search or seizure violated that Fourth 
Amendment right". The first of these questions 
is answered by determining whether the 
defendant has a "legitimate expectation of 
privacy" that has been invaded by a 
governmental search and seizure. The second is 
-15-
answered by determining whether applicable 
cause and warrant requirements have been 
properly observed. 
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 112-113 (1980) (concurring 
opinion, J. Blackmun). 
The Court of Appeals' distinction that one rule of 
procedure applies for warrant searches, while another applies for 
warrantless searches, is totally without authority (Amended slip 
op. at 11). The court cites Rakas v. Illinois for support while 
ignoring the fact that Rakas was a warrantless search case. 
Whether or not a search will be presumed constitutional or 
unconstitutional is irrelevant to a court's initial determination 
of whether any privacy rights of the defendant have been violated. 
The burden to demonstrate the latter obligation rests squarely with 
the defendant. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 131 n.l. Indeed, 
State v. Marshall stands in conflict with a contemporaneous Court 
of Appeals' decision, State v. Webb, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 51-52, 
where the court found the defendant to have failed to carry his 
burden of establishing standing to a warrantless search. 
Nor does Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), 
support the appellate court's reversal in this case (Amended slip, 
op. 10). In Steagald, the government had taken the position in the 
trial court, on appeal, and when opposing the petition for 
certiorari that the house searched was the defendant's residence 
and occupied by defendant and his wife. Id. at 209-210. After 
certiorari was granted, the government for the first time asserted 
that the home was not in fact defendant's but belonged to a third 
party such that defendant had no expectation of privacy in the 
home. Jd. The Court concluded that the government was precluded 
-16-
from arguing a position factually appositive of all its prior 
positions. But, in reaching this conclusion, the United States 
Supreme Court did not hold that the government was generally 
precluded from raising standing for the first time on appeal. To 
the contrary, the Court expressly recognized that the government 
could procedurally have raised the issue in the court of appeals or 
even when opposing certiorari, but instead made explicit factual 
claims to the contrary, ^d. at 211 n.5. The government was 
precluded based on the facts, not the law. Accord United States v. 
Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1453 (10th Cir. 1989) (state precluded from 
arguing contrary factual position on appeal from that specifically 
3 
raised and argued below). 
The decision in State v. Marshall is in conflict with the 
majority of federal and state case law. United States v. 
Skowronski, 827 F.2d 1414, 1417 n.2 (10th Cir. 1987) (raised sua 
sponte); United States v. Wanless, 882 F.2d at 1462-63 n.4 
(government could have raised standing for first time on appeal but 
waived issue where not raised either below or on appeal); People v. 
Dasilva, 254 Cal.Rptr. 563, 565, 207 Cal.App.3d 43 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1989) (state not precluded from arguing standing for the first 
time on appeal); St. John v. State, 400 So.2d 779, 780 (Fla.App. 
1981) (no waiver by state); but compare State v. Wells, 539 So.2d 
464, 468 n.4 (Fla. 1989), cert, granted, 109 S.Ct. 3183 (1989) 
3
 United States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761, 763 (8th Cir. 1984), 
would apply Steagald more strictly by holding that the government 
may lose its right to raise standing on appeal if the government in 
trial asserts that the defendant had sufficient possession for 
conviction. This view is a distinct minority and theoretically 
unsupportable under an expectation of privacy concept of standing. 
United States v. Salvucci, 443 U.S. at 88-89 (a prosecutor may 
legitimately argue that a defendant lacks a privacy interest while 
seeking conviction for a possessory crime). 
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(state waived where as appellant never raised standing below or on 
appeal); People v. Keller, 444 N.E.2d 118, 121, 93 111.2d 432, 67 
111.Dec, 79 (1982) (no waiver where state was appellant but had 
originally prevailed below). See also United States v. Valdes, 876 
F.2d 1554, 1558 n.10 (11th Cir. 1989) (defendant waived search 
issue for garage when only argued below search of vehicle on 
street); United States v. Medina, 887 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 
1989); United States v. Schmit, 881 F.2d 608, 614 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(cases refusing to consider any new claim of error on appeal). 
POINT IV 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING ON CONSENT WAS 
INSUFFICIENT; AND, IMPROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT IT 
MUST FIND PROOF OF CONSENT BY CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 
In remanding this case to the district court for further 
hearing, the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court's finding 
on consent was merely "conclusory" and therefore ambiguous and 
insufficient (Amended slip op. at 14). The appellate court 
concluded that the trial court's finding that the defendant 
consented to the search was not sufficient to "resolve the 
difficult issue of whether Mr. Marshall's opening of the trunk 
constituted implied consent to search the trunk under the totality 
of the circumstances" (Amended slip op. at 14, 15). However, in 
the context of the limited issues raised below, i.e., whether 
defendant consented to the search of the vehicle and truck, the 
finding was adequate and should be upheld. State v. Walker, 743 
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). See also Sweeney Land Company v. 
Kimball, 786 P.2d 760 (Utah 1990) (reversing the Court of Appeals' 
misapplication of the clearly erroneous standard as applied under 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)). 
The Court of Appeals further questioned whether if the 
trial court's finding that there was no evidence of duress or 
coercion was consistent with "the standard required for a voluntary 
consent" (Amended slip op. at 15). Relying on United States v. 
Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977), and State v. Sierra, 754 
P.2d 972, 980-981 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the appellate court defined 
that standard as being clear and convincing proof that the consent 
was "unequivocal and specific and freely and intelligently given" 
(Amended slip. op. at 13). 
This Court has not specified in a published opinion what 
standard of proof applies to the state's burden of establishing 
voluntary consent. However, the preponderance of evidence standard 
appears to be the test adopted by the United States Supreme Court. 
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974) 
("controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose 
no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence"); 
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987) (citing 
Matlock as standing for the principle that "voluntariness of 
consent to search must be shown by preponderance of the 
evidence."). Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 482-87 (1972) 
(preponderance of evidence standard applicable to determination of 
voluntariness of confession). Accord State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 
886, 890 (Utah 1989) (preponderance of evidence standard applicable 
to voluntariness of confession to capital murder). See also 4 La 
Fave, Search and Seizure, S 11.2(c) at 233-37 (1987) (noting spilt 
in courts on question). 
CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests that this Court grant its 
petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 46, in 
that the decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with 
decisions of the United States and Utah Supreme Courts, as well as 
another decision of the Court of Appeals, and has decided the 
standard of proof for consent to search, an issue which has not, 
but should be, settled by this Court. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / ^ ^ day of May, 1990. 
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Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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BILLINGS, Judge: 
The appellant, Gregory J. Marshall (MMr. Marshall"), was 
charged with possession of a controlled substance with the intent 
to distribute for value, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1989). Mr. Marshall filed a pretrial 
motion to suppress the 140 pounds of marijuana seized from the 
rental car he was driving when he was arrested. The trial court 
denied Mr. Marshall's motion and he filed this interlocutory 
appeal. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
We recite the facts surrounding the seizure of the contraband 
in detail as the legal issues presented are fact sensitive. 
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Utah 
Highway Patrol Trooper Denis Avery (-Trooper Avery") was driving 
*This opinion issued on Petition for Rehearing replaces the 
opinion of the same name issued on December 26, 1989. 
on Interstate 70 near Salina, Utah. He noticed Mr. Marshall's 
vehicle in the left-hand lane passing a motor home. Trooper 
Avery observed that Mr. Marshall*s turn signal remained blinking 
for approximately two miles after he passed the motor home. Not 
knowing whether Mr. Marshall's signal was malfunctioning or 
whether Mr. Marshall had negligently left the signal on, Trooper 
Avery pulled the vehicle over to inform Mr. Marshall of the 
problem and to give him a warning ticket. Trooper Avery had 
issued similar warning citations for turn signal violations 
approximately five to ten times in the previous six-month period. 
Prior to stopping Mr. Marshall/ Trooper Avery noticed the 
vehicle had California license plates. He approached Mr. 
Marshall's vehicle and informed Mr. Marshall of the turn signal 
problem. Mr. Marshall responded that he had been having "a hard 
time keeping the thing turned off." 
Trooper Avery asked Mr. Marshall for his driver's license and 
vehicle registration. Mr. Marshall produced a New York driver's 
license and a California rental agreement for the vehicle. Mr. 
Marshall said he was going skiing in Denver and planned to return 
the car to San Diego, California. However, the rental agreement 
indicated that the car would be returned in New York in five days. 
Trooper Avery acknowledged he became suspicious that Mr. 
Marshall might be transporting drugs. Trooper Avery asked Mr. 
Marshall to return with him to his patrol car where he issued a 
warning citation for "Lights, head, tail, other." Trooper Avery 
then returned Mr. Marshall's driver's license and the rental 
agreement. 
Trooper Avery next asked Mr. Marshall if he was carrying 
alcohol, drugs or firearms. Mr. Marshall stated he was not. 
Trooper Avery then asked Mr. Marshall if he could "look inside 
the vehicle." Mr. Marshall responded, "Go ahead." Trooper Avery 
and Mr. Marshall walked back to Mr. Marshall's vehicle. The 
passenger door was locked and Mr. Marshall reached in on the 
driver's side to open the door. Trooper Avery noticed a small 
red bag on the floor of the vehicle and asked if he could open 
it. Mr. Marshall agreed. No contraband was found inside the bag 
or the passenger compartment of the vehicle. 
Trooper Avery then asked if Mr. Marshall had a key to the 
trunk and if Mr. Marshall would open the trunk. Mr. Marshall 
attempted to open the trunk, but was shaking so badly that 
Trooper Avery had to assist him by holding the key latch cover up 
while Mr. Marshall inserted the key. Trooper Avery saw four 
padlocked suitcases when Mr. Marshall opened the trunk. Trooper 
Avery asked Mr. Marshall what the suitcases contained and Mr. 
Marshall responded "clothes." Trooper Avery then asked if he 
could look in the suitcases. Mr. Marshall immediately reversed 
his statement and responded that the suitcases were not his and 
must have already been in the trunk when he rented the vehicle. 
Trooper Avery testified there was some play in the zipper of one 
bag and he unzipped it far enough to see a green leafy 
substance. Trooper Avery then arrested Mr. Marshall for 
possession of a controlled substance. 
Mr. Marshall did not testify or present any evidence to 
contradict Trooper Avery's testimony during the hearing below. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"[W]e will not disturb the trial court's factual evaluation 
underlying its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress 
unless it is clearly erroneous." State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 
974 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). £e& also State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 
191, 193 (Utah 1987); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). Further, "[t]he trial court's finding is clearly 
erroneous only if it is against the clear weight of the evidence 
or if [the appellate court] reachfes] a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Serv, 758 
P.2d 935, 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(c) requires the trial 
court to state its findings on the record "[w]here factual issues 
are involved in determining a motion." Those findings must be 
sufficiently detailed in order to allow us the opportunity to 
adequately review the decision below.1 
1. Utah appellate courts have consistently required detailed 
findings of fact to support a judgment entered by a trial judge 
in civil cases. Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 
1979) ("The importance of complete, accurate and consistent 
findings of fact in a case tried by a judge is essential to the 
resolution of dispute under the proper rule of law. To that end 
the findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was reached."); Sampson v. 
Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002-03 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (findings of 
fact must indicate the "mind of the court." (quoting Parks v. 
Zions First Nat'l Bank. 673 P.2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983)). 
Detailed findings of fact likewise greatly ease the burden of 
an appellate court in its review of a trial court's decision on a 
motion to suppress. This is particularly true where multiple 
issue are presented in the motion to suppress. 4 W. LaFave, 
PRETEXT STOP 
Initially, Mr, Marshall contends Trooper Avery used the fact 
that his turn signal was malfunctioning as a pretext to stop his 
vehicle to search for evidence of drug trafficking. 
The protective shield of the fourth amendment applies when an 
officer stops an automobile on the highway and detains its 
occupants. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). A police officer may constitutionally stop a citizen on 
two alternative grounds. First, the stop "could be based on 
specific, articulable facts which, together with rational 
inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person 
to conclude [defendant] had committed or was about to commit a 
crime." I£. (citing Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State 
v. Christensen. 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984); State v. Truiillo, 
739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). Second, the police 
officer can "stop an automobile for a traffic violation committed 
in the officer's presence." Sierra. 754 P.2d at 977. However, 
an officer may not use a traffic violation stop as a pretext to 
search for evidence of a more serious crime. Id. 
To determine if Trooper Avery stopped Mr. Marshall's vehicle 
to investigate his hunch that Mr. Marshall's vehicle was involved 
in drug trafficking, we determine whether a hypothetical 
reasonable officer, in view of the totality of the circumstances 
confronting him or her, would have stopped Mr. Marshall to issue 
a warning for failing to terminate a turn signal. I&. at 978. 
Mr. Marshall claims Trooper Avery's stop of his vehicle is 
similar to the stop we found unconstitutional in Sierra. We 
disagree. In Sierra, the basis articulated for the stop was that 
the driver remained in the left lane too long after passing a 
car. In this case, Trooper Avery perceived an equipment problem 
with Mr. Marshall's car. Either his turn signal was 
(Footnote 1 continued) 
Search & Seizure § 11.2, at 252 (1987) [hereinafter HLaFaveH] 
(citing State v. Johnson, 16 Or. App. 560, 519 P.2d 1053, 1058-59 
(1974)). Many jurisdictions require specific findings of fact on 
all motions to suppress. See LaFave at § 11.2 n.188. We believe 
the requirement a sound one. 
malfunctioning or he had negligently failed to turn it off.2 
Courts consistently have held that a police officer can stop a 
vehicle when he or she believes the vehicle's safety equipment is 
not functioning properly.3 
Furthermore, unlike the officer in Sierra. Trooper Avery was 
not suspicious of Mr. Marshall for other reasons before the stop, 
had not followed him in order to find some reason to pull him 
over, and, before the alleged violation occurred, had not radioed 
for help thereby indicating he intended to stop the vehicle. 
2. While the warning citation does not specify which provision 
of the Utah Code Mr. Marshall violated, the state asserts that 
his conduct was in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-117(1) 
(1988) which, with our emphasis, provides: 
It is a misdemeanor for any person to 
drive or move or for the owner to cause or 
knowingly permit to be driven or moved on 
any highway any vehicle or combination of 
vehicles which is in such unsafe condition 
as to endanger any person, or which does 
not contain those parts or is not at all 
times equipped with lamps and other 
equipment in proper condition and 
adjustment . . . . 
3. In Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 660-61 (1979), the 
United States Supreme Court stated that an officer has a duty in 
the interest of highway safety to stop vehicles for safety 
reasons. "Many violations of minimum vehicle-safety requirements 
are observable, and something can be done about them by the 
observing officer, directly and immediately.- X&. at 660. The 
Court inferred that as long as an officer suspects the driver is 
violating "any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and 
equipment regulations,- the police officer may legally stop the 
vehicle. l£L at 661. See Townsel v. State. 763 P.2d 1353, 1355 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (court held stop justified when vehicle's 
headlight was out, a tail light was broken, the license plate and 
windows were obscured, and speeding); State v. Puiq. 112 Ariz. 
519, 544 P.2d 201, 202 (1975) (suspicion of defective turn 
signals justified stop); State v. Fuller. 556 A.2d 224, 224 (Me. 
1989) (stop justified when blinking headlights led officer to 
stop vehicle for safety reasons). 
In conclusion we find Trooper Avery's stop of Mr. Marshall's 
vehicle was not a pretext, but was a valid exercise of police 
authority to make certain Mr. Marshall*s vehicle was functioning 
properly. 
UNREASONABLE DETENTION 
Next, Mr. Marshall complains that the extent of his detention 
and the scope of Trooper Avery's investigation exceeded 
constitutional limits.4 
M[I]n determining whether the seizure and search were 
•unreasonable' our inquiry is a dual one—whether the officer's 
action was justified at its inception, and whether it was 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified 
the interference in the first place." Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
19-20 (1968). 
We have previously found that Trooper Avery's traffic stop of 
Mr. Marshall was justified. The remaining question is whether 
Trooper Avery's subsequent detention and questioning of Mr. 
Marshall was reasonably related to the initial traffic stop or 
was justified because Trooper Avery had a reasonable suspicion to 
believe Mr. Marshall was engaged in a more serious crime. United 
States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1988). 
The United States Supreme Court has not chosen to define a 
bright-line rule as to the acceptable length of a detention 
because "common sense and ordinary human experience must govern 
over rigid criteria." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 
(1985). The Court has chosen to focus, not on the length of the 
detention alone, but on "whether the police diligently pursued a 
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their 
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain 
the defendant." Id., at 686. 
Trooper Avery wrote out the warning citation within ten 
minutes of stopping Mr. Marshall and then returned Mr. Marshall's 
driver's license and the vehicle rental agreement. Trooper Avery 
claims that as a result of his examination of Mr. Marshall's 
4. We do not analyze this issue under article I, section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution as the state constitutional issue was not 
sufficiently particularized below nor is a reasoned analysis 
provided on appeal as to why our analysis should be different 
under Utah's constitution. See State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 326, 
327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
driver's license and the vehicle rental agreement and his brief 
conversation with Mr. Marshall, he became suspicious that Mr. 
Marshall was involved in drug trafficking. Specifically, Trooper 
Avery points to the fact that Mr. Marshall produced a New York 
driver's license and a California rental agreement for the 
vehicle. When questioned about the rental agreement, Mr. 
Marshall said he was going skiing in Colorado and planned to 
return the car to San Diego, California. However, the rental 
agreement indicated the car was to be returned to New York in 
five days, the approximate time it takes to drive directly from 
California to New York. In addition, Mr. Marshall was driving 
along a well-known drug trafficking route. 
As a result of his suspicion, Trooper Avery then asked Mr. 
Marshall if he was carrying weapons, alcohol, or drugs in the 
vehicle. Mr. Marshall responded he was not. Then Trooper Avery 
allegedly asked for permission to look into the vehicle and 
received Mr. Marshall's consent. 
The trial judge found that Trooper Avery's "investigation was 
reasonable in view of the defendant's statements in regards to 
the vehicle ownership and the driver's usage. The destination 
itinerary would have put a reasonable officer on notice that 
something was wrong." Although not directly so stating, the 
judge, in substance, concluded that Trooper Avery had reasonable 
suspicion to believe that Mr. Marshall was involved in illegal 
conduct. Although it is a close call, we agree with the trial 
court's assessment of the reasonableness of the detention. 
We find that Trooper Avery's questioning of Mr. Marshall as 
to conduct unrelated to the traffic stop was justified because he 
had reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. Marshall was engaged in a 
more serious crime. See Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1519. 
In conclusion, based on the totality of the circumstances, we 
agree with the trial court that Trooper Avery's ten-minute 
detention and brief questioning of Mr. Marshall prior to Mr, 
Marshall's alleged consent to search the vehicle was not an 
unreasonable detention. 
SEARCH 
On appeal, Mr. Marshall argues that even if his initial stop 
and subsequent detention were not constitutionally deficient, the 
subsequent search of the trunk of the vehicle and the suitcases 
found in the trunk without a warrant violated his fourth 
amendment rights. The state contends, on the other hand, that 
Mr. Marshall consented to the search of the trunk and abandoned 
any privacy interest in the suitcases and thus Trooper Avery's 
search of the suitcases was constitutionally permissible.5 In 
our prior opinion, we focused solely on whether the search of the 
suitcases was proper. We found the warrantless search of the 
suitcases unconstitutional as we refused to allow the state to 
raise the issue of fourth amendment standing for the first time 
on appeal. We granted the state's petition for rehearing to 
re-examine the related fourth amendment issues of voluntary 
consent and abandonment which are central to a resolution of this 
appeal. 
1. Standing 
The state, in its original brief on appeal, claimed Mr. 
Marshall was without standing to challenge the seizure of the 
suitcases as he had disclaimed any ownership or possessory 
interest in the suitcases during the search and thus had no 
expectation of privacy in their contents. See Rakas v. Illinois, 
439 U.S. 128, 138-50 (1978); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 
(Utah 1984); State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70, 73-75 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 196-97 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) . The state relies upon the following testimony from the 
preliminary hearing: 
Q. [Defense Counsel] And what was inside the trunk? 
A. [Trooper Avery] There were four suitcases. 
Q. Did you ask if you could look in those suitcases? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). First of all, I asked him what 
was in the suitcases, and he told me, right quickly, 
clothes. Then when I looked at him again, he told me 
that he didn't know where they came from, they must have 
been in there when he rented the car. 
5. The state does not argue that Trooper Avery had probable 
cause to search either the car or the suitcases. We, therefore, 
need not deal with the troublesome issue of whether probable 
cause to search an automobile is sufficient under the automobile 
exception to search a locked suitcase found in the trunk of a 
car. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (if 
probable cause exists, police can search closed containers found 
in vehicle); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) 
(warrantless search of a suitcase found in the trunk of a taxi 
invalid); United States v. Chadwick. 433 U.S. 1 (1977) 
(warrantless search of a footlocker found in the trunk of a 
vehicle invalid); State v. Hvoh. 711 P.2d 264, 272 n.l (Utah 
1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring separately) (criticizing the 
Ross holding). 
In our prior opinion# we relied on the Utah Supreme Court 
decision of State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), which 
squarely held that standing to challenge the validity of a search 
under the fourth amendment "is not a jurisdictional doctrine 
[but] is a substantive doctrine that identifies those who may 
assert rights against unlawful searches and seizures," Id, at 
1138. Citing the general rule that a substantive issue or -claim 
of error cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,M the 
supreme court deemed the issue of standing waived. I&. at 
1138-39. 
The state attempts to distinguish Schlosser, claiming that in 
that case the state not only failed to raise the issue of 
standing in the motion to suppress hearing, but also on appeal 
and that here, unlike Schlosser, the state raises standing simply 
as an alternative ground to uphold the trial court1s denial of 
the motion to suppress.6 We do not find the distinction 
determinative.7 
6. Prior to Schlosser, the Utah Supreme Court had, in several 
cases, considered standing for the first time on appeal and had 
utilized the doctrine to refuse to consider the constitutional 
validity of a challenged search. See, e.g., State v. 
Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (court 
did not address whether the issue of standing had been raised 
below, but stated that defendant could not assert any expectation 
of privacy in vehicle because he did not own vehicle and had 
presented no testimony that he had permission of owner or had 
borrowed vehicle "under circumstances that would imply permissive 
useM); State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375, 1377-78 (Utah 1986) (State 
below argued there was consent by defendant's ex-wife to search 
his mother's trailer. On appeal, the state argued defendant had 
no possessory or proprietary interest in the trailer and thus had 
no expectation of privacy. The court declined to reach the issue 
of consent because it found that defendant lacked standing to 
object to the search because the stipulated evidence did not show 
that defendant shared ownership, use or possession of the 
trailer.); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984) (At 
trial, the defendant produced evidence that neither the attache 
case in which the evidence was found nor the vehicle belonged to 
the defendant. The court did not address whether the issue of 
standing was raised below, but declined to reach the question of 
the validity of the search because the defendant conceded he did 
not own the case or the vehicle and had failed to show any 
expectation of privacy.). In these earlier cases, it is 
sometimes unclear whether the Utah Supreme Court raised the issue 
of standing sua sponte on appeal or permitted the state to raise 
the issue of standing for the first time on appeal. We assume 
that Schlosser supercedes these earlier cases and thus do not 
follow them. 
7. Although the Utah Supreme Court refused to allow standing to 
be utilized to attack the trial court's granting of a motion to 
The United States Supreme Court took the same position in 
Steaaald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), when it refused 
to allow the government to raise the issue of fourth amendment 
standing for the first time on appeal to provide an alternative 
ground to sustain the trial court*s refusal to grant a motion to 
suppress. The Court concluded: 
Aside from arguing that a search warrant 
was not constitutionally required, the 
Government was initially entitled to 
defend against petitioner's charge of an 
unlawful search by asserting that 
petitioner lacked a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the searched home, or that 
he consented to the search, or that 
exigent circumstances justified the 
entry. The Government, however, may lose 
its right to raise factual issues of this 
sort before this Court when it has made 
contrary assertions in the courts below, 
when it has acquiesced in contrary 
findings by those courts, or when it has 
failed to raise such questions in a timely 
fashion during the litigation. 
Id. at 209 (emphasis added). 
The state, on petition for rehearing, contends that language 
in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) is contrary to our 
conclusion that the state should not be allowed to raise standing 
for the first time on appeal. We disagree. The language in 
Rakas relied upon by the state is consistent with our view. 
The proponent of a motion to suppress has 
the burden of establishing that his own 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated by 
the challenged search or seizure. The 
(Footnote 7 continued) 
suppress in Schlosser, the court relied on State v. Goodman, 42 
Wash. App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057 (1985), which held the state 
could not raise the issue of standing for the first time on 
appeal to provide an alternative ground for sustaining the 
trial court's denial of a motion to suppress. l$i. at 1060. 
prosecutor aroued that petitioners lacked 
standing to challenge the search because 
they did not own the rifle, the shells or 
the automobile. Petitioners did not 
contest the factual predicates of the 
prosecutor's argument and instead, simply 
stated that they were not required to 
prove ownership to object to the searcht 
The prosecutor's argument gave petitioners 
notice that they were to be pvt to their 
proof on any issue as to which they had 
the burden, and because of their failure 
to assert ownership, we must assume, for 
purposes of our review, that petitioners 
do not own the rifle or the shells. 
Id. at 130 n.l (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
We agree with the state and Rakas that Mr. Marshall has 
the ultimate burden of proof to establish that his fourth 
amendment rights were violated or, to put it otherwise, that 
he had an expectation of privacy in the area searched or the 
articles seized.8 Nevertheless, warrantless searches are 
per se unreasonable and the burden is on the state, in the 
first instance, to show that a warrantless search is lawful. 
State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984). 
We believe Rakas is consistent with our view that the 
prosecutor, as part of the state's burden to establish the 
constitutionality of a warrantless search, must give a 
defendant "notice that he will be put to his proof on the 
issue of fourth amendment standing. This can be done at any 
time during the hearing on a defendant's motion to suppress as 
long as the defendant has an opportunity to put on evidence to 
8. However, the failure of the state to challenge Mr. 
Marshall's standing at the suppression hearing did not give 
Mr. Marshall an opportunity to assert his expectation of 
privacy. See Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227-28 
(1972) (per curiam) (Where petitioner's failure to assert an 
expectation of privacy may have been explained by the 
Government's failure to challenge standing either at the 
suppression hearing or at trial, the United States Supreme 
Court remanded to the district court for further proceedings 
to allow petitioner to establish a privacy interest.). 
meet the claim.9 Once the defendant has been put on notice 
that the state claims the warrantless search was 
constitutional because he has no expectation of privacy in the 
area searched, then the defendant must factually demonstrate 
that he does have standing to contest the warrantless search. 
We believe the Schlosser standing rule was fashioned to 
protect the defendant from being required to deal with new 
legal issues on appeal when he had no warning of the necessity 
to develop the relevant facts below. 
2. Consent/Abandonment 
The state, on petition for rehearing, excuses its failure 
to raise the issue of standing claiming that neither Mr. 
Marshall, the state nor the trial judge focused on the search 
of the suitcases in the motion to suppress hearing. Rather, 
the state claims the hearing centered on the pretextual nature 
of the stop, the unreasonable detention of Mr. Marshall and 
the unlawful search of the trunk. 
Mr. Marshall, on petition for rehearing, claims the 
following comment made by defense counsel sufficiently focused 
the proceeding on the search of the suitcases: "Additionally 
there is no evidence that there was consent to search the 
bags." 
Upon a re-examination of the record, we agree with the 
state that the parties and the trial judge did not focus on 
the critical issue of the search of the suitcases at the 
motion to suppress hearing. The result is that the trial 
judge did not make adequate findings of fact on the issues of 
voluntary consent to search the trunk or the suitcases and Mr. 
Marshall's alleged abandonment of any privacy interest in the 
suitcases, which the parties now agree are pivotal on appeal. 
We therefore remand for a rehearing on these critical issues. 
9. The defendant's testimony at the motion to suppress 
hearing cannot be used against the defendant at trial. See 
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (prosecutor 
cannot use a defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing as 
substantive evidence of guilt at trial unless defendant makes 
no objection). We note, however, that the United States 
Supreme Court had not decided whether the Simmons rule 
precludes the use of a defendant's suppression hearing 
testimony to impeach the defendant's testimony at trial. See 
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 94 & n.9 (1980). 
We nevertheless discuss the controlling law to guide the trial 
court on rehearing. 
A search is valid under the fourth amendment if it is 
conducted as a result of the defendant's voluntary consent. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "[T]he 
question [of] whether a consent to a search was in fact 
•voluntary* or was the product of duress or coercion, express 
or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the 
totality of all the circumstances." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 
227. "A trial court's finding of voluntary consent will not 
be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous." United States v. 
Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130 (1st Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440 
U.S. 958 (1979). 
In United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977), 
the Tenth Circuit outlined the specifics necessary for the 
government to sustain its burden to show that voluntary consent 
was given: 
(1) There must be clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was 
•'unequivocal and specific" and "freely and 
intelligently given"; (2) the government 
must prove consent was given without 
duress or coercion, express or implied; 
and (3) the courts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against the waiver 
of fundamental constitutional rights and 
there must be convincing evidence that 
such rights were waived. 
Id. at 885 (quoting Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 
(10th Cir. 1962)). S££ also United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 
1448, 1453 (10th Cir. 1985). See generally State v. Whittenback, 
621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 
980-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Even when a defendant voluntarily consents to a search, the 
ensuing search must be limited in scope to only the specific area 
agreed to by defendant. "The scope of a consent search is 
limited by the breadth of the actual consent itself. . . . Any 
police activity that transcends the actual scope of the consent 
given encroaches on the Fourth Amendment rights of the suspect." 
United States v. Gav, 774 F.2d 368, 377 (10th Cir. 1985); see, 
e.g., People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 201 (Colo. 1984) (scope of 
consent exceeded when police asked to -look around- the house, 
then conducted a 45-minute search of rooms, drawers, boxes and 
closed containers). 
The trial court made the following conclusory finding on the 
issue of Mr. Marshall's consent: -The Defendant consented to the 
search. There was no evidence of duress or coercion.- This 
conclusory finding on consent is not particularly helpful in 
determining whether Mr. Marshall's consent was -unequivocal and 
specific- as it does not detail what Mr. Marshall agreed could be 
searched—the interior of the passenger compartment, the trunk, 
or the locked suitcases.10 Furthermore, the relevant portions 
from the transcript of Trooper Avery's testimony are troubling: 
Q. [Defense Counsel] What were the words he [sic] used 
when you asked him to search his vehicle? 
A. [Trooper Avery] I asked Mr. Marshall if—if there were 
any—if there was any—were there any drugs in the 
vehicle, and he took two or three seconds—no, wait a 
minute, I guess—I first asked him if he was carrying 
any weapons and he told me no. I then asked him if he 
was carrying any—if there was any alcohol in the 
vehicle, he said that he did not drink. I recall both 
answers were quite quick. And then I asked him if there 
were any drugs in the vehicle, he paused for, you know, 
probably two or three seconds, and then told me no. I 
then asked him if it would be okay if I looked in the 
vehicle, search the vehicle, and he said go ahead. 
Q. Now, did you ask if you could look in the vehicle, or 
did you ask if you could search the vehicle? 
A. Well, according to this [his report], I said—I asked if 
I could look in the vehicle. 
Q. So, it was -look in the vehicle-? 
You didn't ask if you could open anything inside the 
vehicle or anything else, did you? 
10. See supra note 1 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the importance of detailed findings on a motion to suppress. 
A. No. I just asked if I could look in the vehicle. 
Q. And what happened then? 
A. Mr. Marshall just told me# you know, he said go right 
ahead. He got out, gathered up his papers and we walked 
up to the front of the vehicle, and he had to open the 
passenger door, as I recall. 
Q. And how did you get in the trunk? 
A. I asked him, I said—asked him if he had the key to the 
trunk and he says yes, and I says—and I asked him if 
he'[d] open it, which he did, he tried. He was 
extremely nervous at the time. I— 
Q. So did you open the trunk? 
A. No, sir, I did not. He—he could not—there was a 
little latch over the key hole. He was shaking so hard, 
he couldn't even hold the latch open, so I held the 
latch up for him so he could insert the key. 
Without the assistance of specific findings of fact, we 
cannot resolve the difficult issue of whether Mr. Marshall's 
opening the trunk constituted implied consent to search the trunk 
under the totality of the circumstances presented. See United 
States v. Almand, 565 F.2d 927, 930 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 439 
U.S. 824 (1978) (voluntary consent found where defendant silently 
reached into his pocket, removed key, then unlocked and opened 
camper door). 
Furthermore, the record creates a substantial question as to 
whether the court's general finding that there was "no evidence 
of duress or coercion" was intended to apply to the search of the 
trunk or, even if it was, whether the finding is consistent with 
the standard required for a voluntary consent. See United States 
v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977); State v. Sierra, 754 
P.2d 972, 980-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Likewise, the court in 
its findings fails to focus on the search of the locked suitcases 
and the issues of voluntary consent or abandonment. 
Even if we were to accept the state's argument that the 
undisputed facts support a finding that Mr. Marshall 
abandoned11 any expectation of privacy in the suitcases by his 
ambiguous disclaimer of ownership and that the state should be 
allowed to raise this fourth amendment standing issue for the 
first time on appeal, we would be unable to dispose of this case 
on the record before us. The state, in its petition for 
rehearing, correctly points out that "a loss of standing to 
challenge a search cannot be brought about by illegal police 
conduct." United States v. Labat, 696 F. Supp. 1419, 1425 (D. 
Kan. 1988). 
Thus, we would have to determine if the search of the trunk 
was illegal or was a result of a voluntary consent. This we 
cannot do on the record before us. 
Even if we determined the search of the trunk was unlawful, 
the "defendant must show a nexus between the allegedly unlawful 
police conduct and the abandonment of the property." Ifi. at 
1426. See, e.g., United States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041 (6th 
Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (While "an 
unconstitutional seizure or arrest which prompts a disclaimer of 
property vitiates that act," jjl. at 1045, the court found the 
defendant's disclaimer was not precipitated by improper conduct. 
Id. at 1048.); United States v. Gilman, 684 F.2d 616, 620 (9th 
Cir. 1982) ("There must be a nexus between the allegedly unlawful 
police conduct and abandonment of property if the challenged 
11. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1173 (10th 
Cir. 1983) (Court found abandonment when police initially saw 
defendant running with a brown satchel, however, when they 
captured defendant, he did not have the satchel and disavowed 
knowledge of it. Police later found the satchel outside the 
building and searched it.); United States v. Kendall, 655 F.2d 
199, 202 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982) 
(court found abandonment where the defendant, after picking up 
the luggage at the claim area, produced a mismatched baggage 
claim check, told agents that his name was not on the luggage 
name tag, and allowed the agents to return the luggage to the 
claim area, thus giving the agents the impression that he had no 
interest in the luggage); United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217, 
1220-21 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 456 U.S. 946 (1982) (court 
found abandonment where the defendant disclaimed ownership of a 
wallet found on the seat of the vehicle); United States v. 
Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (court found 
abandonment when defendants disclaimed ownership of suitcases and 
began to walk away from them). 
evidence is to be suppressed."); United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d 
726, 730 (5th Cir. 1979) (if there is a nexus between unlawful 
police conduct and the discovery of evidence, the court should 
suppress the evidence). See generally Search and Seizure; What 
Constitutes Abandonment of Personal Property within Rule that 
Search and Seizure of Abandoned Property Is Not 
Unreasonable—Modern Cases. 40 A.L.R.4th 381 (1985). Again, 
there is no finding on this crucial issue. 
Therefore, we reverse and remand this interlocutory appeal 
for a rehearing on Mr. Marshall's motion to suppress on the 
limited issues of whether Mr. Marshall voluntarily consented to 
the search of the trunk or the suitcases, whether Mr. Marshall 
abandoned any privacy interest in the suitcases and thus lacks 
standing to challenge their search, and finally, if the trial 
court finds there was an illegal search of the trunk or 
suitcases, whether there is a sufficient nexus between that 
illegal search and Mr. Marshall's abandonment, if any, of his 
expectation of privacy in the suitcases. 
a 
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BILLINGS, Judge: 
The appellant, Gregory J. Marshall ("Mr. Marshall-), was 
charged with possession of a controlled substance with the intent 
to distribute for value, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1989). Mr. Marshall filed a pre-trial 
motion to suppress the 140 pounds of marijuana seized from the 
rental car he was driving when he was arrested. The trial court 
denied Mr. Marshall's motion and he filed this interlocutory 
appeal. We reverse. 
We recite the facts surrounding the seizure of the contraband 
in detail as the legal issues presented are fact sensitive. 
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Utah 
Highway Patrol Trooper Denis Avery ("Trooper Avery") was driving 
on Interstate 70 near Salina, Utah. He noticed Mr. Marshall's 
vehicle in the left-hand lane passing a motor home. Trooper 
Avery observed that Mr. Marshall's turn signal remained blinking 
for approximately two miles after he passed the motor home. Not 
knowing whether Mr. Marshall's signal was malfunctioning or 
whether Mr. Marshall had negligently left the signal on, Trooper 
Avery pulled the vehicle over to inform Mr, Marshall of the 
problem and to give him a warning ticket. Trooper Avery had 
issued similar warning citations for turn signal violations 
approximately five to ten times in the previous six-month period. 
Prior to stopping Mr. Marshall, Trooper Avery noticed the 
vehicle had California license plates. He approached Mr. 
Marshall's vehicle and informed Mr. Marshall of the turn signal 
problem. Mr. Marshall responded that he had been having "a hard 
time keeping the thing turned off.H 
Trooper Avery asked Mr. Marshall for his driver's license and 
vehicle registration. Mr. Marshall produced a New York driver's 
license and a California rental agreement for the vehicle. Mr. 
Marshall said he was going skiing in Denver and planned to return 
the car to San Diego, California. However, the rental agreement 
indicated that the car would be returned in New York in five days. 
Trooper Avery acknowledged he became suspicious that Mr. 
Marshall might be transporting drugs. Trooper Avery asked Mr. 
Marshall to return with him to his patrol car where he issued a 
warning citation for "Lights, head, tail, other.H Trooper Avery 
then returned Mr. Marshall's driver's license and the rental 
agreement. 
Trooper Avery next asked Mr. Marshall if he was carrying 
alcohol, drugs or firearms. Mr. Marshall stated he was not. 
Trooper Avery then asked Mr. Marshall if he could "look inside 
the vehicle." Mr. Marshall responded, "Go ahead." Trooper Avery 
and Mr. Marshall walked back to Mr. Marshall's vehicle. The 
passenger door was locked and Mr. Marshall reached in on the 
driver's side to open the door. Trooper Avery noticed a small 
red bag on the floor of the vehicle and asked if he could open 
it. Mr. Marshall agreed. No contraband was found inside the bag 
or the passenger compartment of the vehicle. 
Trooper Avery then asked if Mr. Marshall had a key to the 
trunk and if Mr. Marshall would open the trunk. Mr. Marshall 
attempted to open the trunk, but was shaking so badly that 
Trooper Avery had to assist him by holding the key latch cover up 
while Mr. Marshall inserted the key. Trooper Avery saw four 
padlocked suitcases when Mr. Marshall opened the trunk. Trooper 
Avery asked Mr. Marshall what the suitcases contained and Mr. 
Marshall responded "clothes." Trooper Avery then asked if he 
could look in the suitcases. Mr. Marshall immediately reversed 
his statement and responded that the suitcases were not his and 
must have already been in the trunk when he rented the vehicle. 
Trooper Avery testified there was some play in the zipper of one 
bag and he unzipped it far enough to see a green leafy 
substance. Trooper Avery then arrested Mr. Marshall for 
possession of a controlled substance. 
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Mr. Marshall did not testify or present any evidence to 
contradict Trooper Avery's testimony during the hearing below. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
M[W]e will not disturb the trial court's factual evaluation 
underlying its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress 
unless it is clearly erroneous." State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 
974 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). &££ also State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 
191, 193 (Utah 1987); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). Further, "[t]he trial court's finding is clearly 
erroneous only if it is against the clear weight of the evidence 
or if [the appellate court] reach[es] a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Sery, 758 
P.2d 935, 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
STANDING—EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
The state argues that we need not reach the issues asserted 
by Mr. Marshall that Trooper Averyfs stop of Mr. Marshall was an 
unconstitutional pretext, or that his consequent detention 
exceeded constitutional limits, or that Mr. Marshall did not 
voluntarily consent to the search of the suitcases found in the 
trunk of his rental car. As a threshold argument, the state 
claims that Mr. Marshall lacks standing to challenge the seizure 
of the suitcases as he disclaimed any ownership or possessory 
interest in the suitcases both during the search and subsequent 
to his arrest and, thus, had no expectation of privacy in their 
contents.1 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-50 (1978); 
State v, Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Grueber, 776 P.2d 70, 73-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. DeAlo, 
748 P.2d 194, 196-97 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The fatal problem with the state's argument is the state 
raises standing for the first time on appeal. The Utah Supreme 
1. The state relies upon the following testimony from the 
preliminary hearing: 
Q. And what was inside the trunk? 
A. There were four suitcases. 
Q. Did you ask if you could look in those suitcases? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). First of all, I asked him what 
was in the suitcases, and he told me, right quickly, 
clothes. Then when I looked at him again, he told me 
that he didn't know where they came from, they must have 
been in there when he rented the car. 
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Court recently squarely held that standing to challenge the 
validity of a search under the fourth amendment "is not a 
jurisdictional doctrine [but] is a substantive doctrine that 
identifies those who may assert rights against unlawful searches 
and seizures.- State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132# 1138 (Utah 
1989). Citing the general rule that a substantive issue or 
"claim of error cannot be raised for the first time on appeal," 
the court deemed the issue of standing waived, id. at 1138-39. 
The state attempts to distinguish Schlosser, claiming that in 
Schlosser the state not only failed to raise the issue of 
standing in the motion to suppress hearing, but also on appeal. 
We do not find the distinction determinative. We believe the 
Schlosser standing rule was fashioned to protect the defendant 
from being required to deal with new legal issues on appeal when 
he had no warning of the necessity to develop the relevant facts 
below. 
In this case, the state, the defendant, and the trial court 
all focused on the issue of voluntary consent to search the 
suitcases, not standing to assert a privacy interest in the 
suitcases. The defendant may well have chosen to testify at the 
motion to suppress hearing to contradict the trooper's testimony 
that he had disclaimed ownership of the suitcases had the state 
chosen to litigate the issue of standing below. 
In Steaoald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), the United 
States Supreme Court also refused to allow the government to 
raise the issue of fourth amendment standing for the first time 
on appeal. The Court refused to allow the state to claim that 
the defendant had no expectation of privacy in the house searched 
as a ground for sustaining the lower court's ruling denying a 
motion to suppress when the state had not made this claim at 
trial. The Court concluded: 
The Government, however, may lose its 
right to raise factual issues of this sort 
before this Court when it has made 
contrary assertions in the courts below, 
when it has acquiesced in contrary 
findings by those courts, or when it has 
failed to raise such questions in a timely 
fashion during the litigation. 
IS. at 209. 
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Thus, we conclude that the state may not for the first time 
on appeal claim that Mr* Marshall lacks standing to assert a 
privacy interest in the contraband seized to uphold the trial 
court's denial of the motion to suppress.2 
2. Our conclusion may seem at odds with the general rule that we 
"may affirm the trial courtfs decision on any proper grounds, 
even though the trial court assigned another reason for its 
ruling.- State v. Brvan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985). We 
agree with the general rule, but find the issue of fourth 
amendment standing to be unique. Fourth amendment standing 
involves more than simply applying another legal principle to 
sustain an evidentiary ruling. The failure to raise a fourth 
amendment standing claim is more analogous to the failure to 
plead and try an affirmative defense or an attempt to assert a 
new theory of recovery for the first tirie on appeal. See 
Banoerter v. Poulton. 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983) ("It is 
axiomatic that defenses and claims not raised by the parties in 
the trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal."); 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(defendant cannot raise constitutional issues for first time on 
appeal); Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1005 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (defendant cannot raise affirmative defense for first time 
on appeal); James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) ("matters not raised in the pleadings nor put in issue at 
the trial may not be raised for the first time on appeal.-); 
Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc.. 739 P.2d 634, 637 n.2 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (matters not presented to trial court prior 
to summary judgment cannot be raised for first time on appeal). 
The state asserts fourth amendment standing to validate what 
otherwise would be an unconstitutional search. The defendant 
must have an opportunity to factually meet this defense to an 
unconstitutional search. 
Furthermore, although the Utah Supreme Court applied the 
waiver of fourth amendment standing rule to uphold the trial 
court's granting of a motion to suppress in Schlosser. the court 
relied on State v. Goodman. 42 Wash. App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057 
(1985), which held the state could not raise the issue of 
standing for the first time on appeal to provide an alternative 
ground for sustaining the trial court's denial of a motion to 
suppress. Id. at 1060. 
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PRETEXT STOP 
Initially, Mr. Marshall contends Trooper Avery used the fact 
that his turn signal was malfunctioning as a pretext to stop his 
vehicle to search for evidence of drug trafficking. 
The protective shield of the fourth amendment applies when an 
officer stops an automobile on the highway and detains its 
occupants. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). A police officer may constitutionally stop a citizen on 
two alternative grounds. First, the stop "could be based on 
specific, articulable facts which, together with rational 
inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person 
to conclude [defendant] had committed or was about to commit a 
crime.- Id., (citing Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State 
v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984); State v. Truiillo, 
739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). Second, the police 
officer can "stop an automobile for a traffic violation committed 
in the officer's presence." Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977. However, 
an officer may not use a traffic violation stop as a pretext to 
search for evidence of a more serious crime. Ifl. 
To determine if Trooper Avery stopped Mr. Marshall's vehicle 
to investigate his hunch that Mr. Marshall's vehicle was involved 
in drug trafficking, we determine whether a hypothetical 
reasonable officer, in view of the totality of the circumstances 
confronting him or her, would have stopped Mr. Marshall to issue 
a warning for failing to terminate a turn signal. Ifi. at 978. 
Mr. Marshall claims Trooper Avery's stop of his vehicle is 
similar to the stop we found unconstitutional in Sierra. We 
disagree. In Sierra, the basis articulated for the stop was that 
the driver remained in the left lane too long after passing a 
car. In this case, Trooper Avery perceived an equipment problem 
with Mr. Marshall's car. Either his turn signal was 
malfunctioning or he had negligently failed to turn it off.3 
Courts consistently have held that a police officer can stop a 
3. While the warning citation does not specify which provision 
of the Utah Code Mr. Marshall violated, the state asserts that 
his conduct was in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-117(1) 
(1988) which, with our emphasis, provides: 
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car when he or she believes the carfs safety equipment is not 
functioning properly.4 
Furthermore, unlike the officer in Sierra. Trooper Avery was 
not suspicious of Mr. Marshall for other reasons before the stop, 
had not followed him in order to find some reason to pull him 
over, and, before the alleged violation occurred, had not radioed 
for help thereby indicating he intended to stop the vehicle. 
In conclusion, we find Trooper Averyfs stop of Mr. Marshall's 
vehicle was not a pretext, but was a valid exercise of police 
authority to make certain Mr. Marshall's vehicle was functioning 
properly. 
(Footnote 3 continued) 
It is a misdemeanor for any person to 
drive or move or for the owner to cause or 
knowingly permit to be driven or moved on 
any highway any vehicle or combination of 
vehicles which is in such unsafe condition 
as to endanger any person, 01 which does 
not contain those parts or is not at all 
times equipped with lamps and other 
equipment in proper condition and 
adjustment . . . . 
4. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660-61 (1979), the 
United States Supreme Court stated that an officer has a duty in 
the interest of highway safety to stop vehicles for safety 
reasons. "Many violations of minimum vehicle-safety requirements 
are observable, and something can be done about them by the 
observing officer, directly and immediately.H ifi. at 660. The 
Court inferred that as long as an officer suspects the driver is 
violating "any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and 
equipment regulations," the police officer may legally stop the 
vehicle. Ifl. at 661. See Townsel v. State, 763 P.2d 1353, 1355 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (court held stop justified when vehicle's 
headlight was out, a tail light was broken, the license plate and 
windows were obscured, and speeding); State v. Puiq, 112 Ariz. 
519, 544 P.2d 201, 202 (1975) (suspicion of defective turn 
signals justified stop); State v. Fuller, 556 A.2d 224, 224 (Me. 
1989) (stop justified when blinking headlights led officer to 
stop vehicle for safety reasons). 
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UNREASONABLE DETENTION 
Next, Mr. Marshall complains generally that the extent of his 
detention and the scope of Trooper Avery's investigation exceeded 
constitutional limits.5 Again, we disagree. 
Once a driver is lawfully stopped, an officer may inquire as 
to information about the driver and the vehicle "reasonably 
related in scope to the justification" for the detention. United 
States v. Briononi-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (quoting Terry 
v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)). 
The United States Supreme Court has not chosen to define a 
bright-line rule as to the acceptable length of a detention 
because "common sense and ordinary human experience must govern 
over rigid criteria." United States v. Sharoe. 470 U.S. 675, 685 
(1985). The Court has chosen to focus, not on the length of the 
detention alone, but on "whether the police diligently pursued a 
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their 
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain 
the defendant." !£. at 686. 
In Sharpe, the Court found that a twenty-minute detention 
after a highway stop for suspected drug trafficking was not 
excessive where the officer examined the driver's license, 
examined his ownership papers, requested and was denied 
permission to search the camper, and then stepped on the rear 
bumper, noting that it did not move, thus confirming his 
suspicion that it was overloaded. Ifl. at 687. The Court 
distinguished this reasonable detention from those involved in 
Dunawav v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491 (1983); and United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), 
stating that it was not the length of detention, but the events 
which occurred during the detention which transformed the 
5. We do not analyze this issue under article I, section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution as the state constitutional issue was not 
sufficiently particularized below nor is a reasoned analysis 
provided on appeal as to why our analysis should be different 
under Utahfs constitution. See State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 
327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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investigative stops in these cases into a "defacto arrest.H id. 
at 683-86.6 
Trooper Avery wrote out the warning citation within ten 
minutes of stopping Mr. Marshall. Based upon the facts obtained 
during routine questioning and issuing the warning citation, the 
officer became suspicious that Mr. Marshall was involved in 
transporting drugs. He returned Mr. Marshall's driver's license, 
the car rental agreement and the citation. Trooper Avery then 
asked Mr. Marshall if he was carrying weapons, alcohol, or drugs 
in the vehicle. Mr. Marshall responded he was not. Then Trooper 
Avery immediately asked for permission to look into the vehicle 
and received Mr. Marshall's consent. 
We find that Trooper Avery's initial investigation was within 
the scope of his traffic stop and that Trooper Avery's immediate 
request to search the vehicle and his expeditious completion of 
the search did not constitute an unreasonable detention. 
Furthermore, Mr. Marshall was not moved to another location nor 
treated in a manner to support a finding of a "defacto arrest." 
CONSENT 
Finally, Mr. Marshall argues that even if his initial stop 
and subsequent detention were not constitutionally deficient, the 
subsequent search of the suitcases found in the trunk of the 
vehicle without a warrant violated his fourth amendment rights. 
The state contends, on the other hand, that Mr. Marshall 
consented to the search of the suitcases and thus Trooper Avery's 
6. Dunawav v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (defendant taken 
from neighbor's home, transported unwillingly to police station, 
was subjected to custodial interrogation for one hour until he 
made incriminating statements); Florida v. Royer. 460 U.S. 491 
(1983) (defendant stopped at airport, his luggage seized, then he 
was taken to a small room where he was questioned and his luggage 
inspected); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) 
(defendant stopped at airport, his luggage seized for 90 minutes 
to take it to narcotics detection dog for "sniff test," police 
knew of arrival time and should have had the dog on hand). 
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search of the suitcases and subsequent seizure of the marijuana 
without a search warrant was constitutionally permissible.' 
A search is valid under the fourth amendment if it is 
conducted as a result of the defendants voluntary consent. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "[T]he question 
[of] whether a consent to a search was in fact •voluntary1 or was 
the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a 
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the 
circumstances." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. "A trial court's 
finding of voluntary consent will not be reversed unless it is 
clearly erroneous." United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130 
(1st Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979). 
In United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977), 
the Tenth Circuit outlined the specifics necessary for the 
government to sustain its burden to show that voluntary consent 
was given: 
(1) There must be clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was 
••unequivocal and specific" and "freely and 
intelligently given"; (2) the government 
must prove consent was given without 
duress or coercion, express or implied; 
and (3) the courts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against the waiver 
of fundamental constitutional rights and 
there must be convincing evidence that 
such rights were waived. 
7. The state does not argue that Trooper Avery had probable 
cause to search either the car or the suitcases. We, therefore, 
need not deal with the troublesome issue of whether probable 
cause to search an automobile is sufficient under the automobile 
exception to search a locked suitcase found in the trunk of a 
car. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (if 
probable cause exists, police can search closed containers found 
in vehicle); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) 
(warrantless search of a suitcase found in the trunk of a taxi 
invalid); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) 
(warrantless search of a footlocker found in the trunk of a 
vehicle invalid); State v. Hvoh, 711 P.2d 264, 272 n.l (Utah 
1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring separately) (criticizing the 
Ross holding). 
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Id. at 885 (quoting Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 
(10th Cir. 1962)). See also United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 
1448, 1453 (10th Cir. 1985). See generally State v. Whittenback. 
621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 
980-81 (Utah Ct. Appl 1988). 
Even when a defendant voluntarily consents to a search, the 
ensuing search must be limited in scope to only the specific area 
agreed to by defendant. "The scope of a consent search is 
limited by the breadth of the actual consent itself. . . . Any 
police activity that transcends the actual scope of the consent 
given encroaches on the Fourth Amendment rights of the suspect.M 
United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 377 (10th Cir. 1985); see, 
e.g., People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 201 (Colo. 1984) (scope of 
consent exceeded when police asked to ••look around" the house, 
then conducted a 45-minute search of rooms, drawers, boxes and 
closed containers). 
The trial court made the following finding on the issue of 
Mr. Marshall's consent: "The Defendant consented to the search. 
There was no evidence of duress or coercion." This conclusory 
finding on consent is not particularly helpful in determining 
whether Mr. Marshall*s consent was "unequivocal and specific" as 
it does not detail what Mr. Marshall agreed could be 
searched—the interior of the passenger compartment, the trunk, 
or the locked suitcases. The relevant portions from the 
transcript of Trooper Averyfs testimony are more enlightening: 
Q. What were the words he [sic] used when you asked him to 
search his vehicle? 
A. I asked Mr. Marshall if—if there were any—if there was 
any—were there any drugs in the vehicle, and he took 
two or three seconds—no, wait a minute, I guess—I 
first asked him if he was carrying any weapons and he 
told me no. I then asked him if he was carrying any—if 
there was any alcohol in the vehicle, he said that he 
did not drink. I recall both answers were quite quick. 
And then I asked him if there were any drugs in the 
vehicle, he paused for, you know, probably two or three 
seconds, and then told me no. I then asked him if it 
would be okay if I looked in the vehicle, search the 
vehicle, and he said go ahead. 
Q. Now, did you ask if you could look in the vehicle, or 
did you ask if you could search the vehicle. 
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Well, according to this [his report], I said—I asked if 
I could look in the vehicle. 
So, it was ••look in the vehicle"? 
You didn't ask if you could open anything inside the 
vehicle or anything else, did you? 
No. I just asked if I could look in the vehicle. 
And what happened then? 
Mr. Marshall just told me, you know, he said go right 
ahead. He got out, gathered up his papers and we walked 
up to the front of the vehicle, and he had to open the 
passenger door, as I recall. 
And how did you get in the trunk? 
I asked him, I said—asked him if he had the key to the 
trunk and he says yes, and I says—and I asked him if 
he's [sic] open it, which he did, he tried. He was 
extremely nervous at the time. I— 
So did you open the trunk? 
No, sir, I did not. He—he could not—there was a 
little latch over the key hole. He was shaking so hard, 
he couldn't even hold the latch open, so I held the 
latch up for him so he could insert the key. 
And what was inside the trunk? 
There were four suitcases. 
Did you ask if you could look in those suitcases? 
Uh huh (affirmative). First of all, I asked him what 
was in the suitcases, and he told me, right quickly, 
clothes. Then when I looked at him again, he told me 
that he didn't know where they came from, they must have 
been in there when he rented the car. 
At that point, you opened the suitcases? 
CA 12 
A. Couldn't open them, they were padlocked shut. 
Q. So, you broke the lock? 
A. No. I—one part could zip open a little ways, and I 
opened it—or unzipped it, far enough where I could see 
the contents of one bag. 
Q. And you didn't ask permission to look inside the 
suitcases, did you? 
A. I don't recall if I asked specifically to look inside 
those/ no. 
Q. So, to look inside the suitcases, you were based on the 
permission to look inside the vehicle; is that correct? 
A. Well, I retract that. His first response was clothes 
when I asked him what it was, and then 1 asked him if I 
could look in the suitcases, and he told me, well, 
they're not mine, they must have been in the trunk when 
I rented the car. So, yes, he did say they weren't his. 
Q. If they weren't his, how come you charged him with the 
crime? 
A. He told me they weren't his, that's what he said. He 
said go—when I asked— 
Q. But you didn't ever get permission from him to search 
the suitcases, did you? And at that point, you had them 
out of the vehicle; is that correct? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). I took one out. 
Q. And it was locked? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). 
Q. And you had to work around the lock to look inside? 
A. Well, there was a little play in it, enough where you 
could see inside. 
Q. And to look inside the suitcase, you were basing the 
permission to look inside the vehicle? 
A. Yes. 
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Mr. Marshall contends that Trooper Avery*s request to "look 
in the carM did not constitute a request to search the vehicle. 
We disagree. Mr. Marshall gave his consent, although not 
precisely phrased as consent "to search," then stood by while the 
trooper searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle. 
"Failure to object to the continuation of the search under these 
circumstances may be considered an indication that the search was 
within the scope of consent." United States v. Espinoza. 782 
F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986); £££ also United States v. 
Corral-Corral. 702 F. Supp. 1539, 1544 (D. Wyo. 1988). 
Because of our holding, we need not reach the more difficult 
issue of whether Mr. Marshall's opening the trunk constituted 
implied consent to search the trunk under the totality of the 
circumstances presented. See United States v. Almand. 565 F.2d 
927, 930 (5th Cir.), cert, denied. 439 U.S. 824 (1978) (voluntary 
consent found where defendant silently reached into his pocket, 
removed key, then unlocked and opened camper door). 
Mr. Marshall did not consent to Trooper Avery's search of the 
locked suitcases. The state does not argue that Mr. Marshall's 
consent to search the trunk should be construed to include locked 
suitcases found in the trunk.8 Rather, the state argues that 
his disclaimer of ownership of the suitcases should be construed 
to validate the search. We agree that Mr. Marshall made a 
somewhat ambiguous disclaimer of ownership of the four suitcases 
found in the trunk of the vehicle, but he did not give his 
consent to their search.9 The state has not referred us to any 
case where a disclaimer of ownership has been held to be a 
voluntary consent to search. The cases approving the subsequent 
search of a suitcase after disclaimer of ownership have all 
turned on the threshold issue of standing or abandonment, not 
8. .§££ State v. Cole. 31 Wash. App. 501, 643 P.2d 675 (1982), 
where the defendant gave permission to search his hatchback 
vehicle, but did not give consent to search the suitcases found 
in the vehicle. Ifl. at 678. The court held that the consent to 
search the vehicle did not encompassed the suitcases. Id. 
9. Trooper Avery believed that Mr. Marshall's denial of 
ownership of the suitcases validated the search. He did what our 
case law has instructed and the defect in the search was not as a 
result of his actions, but rather those of the prosecutor in 
failing to properly raise the issue of standing. 
890121-CA 14 
consent.10 We refuse to rely on this authority as it would 
allow the state to circumvent the teachings of State v. 
Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), and allow the state to 
raise the issue of fourth amendment standing for the first time 
on appeal by way of the back door. 
In summary, we reverse the trial court's denial of the motion 
to suppress as Mr. Marshall did not consent-in-fact11 to the 
search of the locked suitcases found in the trunk of his vehicle. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
10. See United States v. Williams, 538 F.2d 549, 550-51 (4th 
Cir. 1976) (court found abandonment and held cases properly 
seized when defendant denied ownership of certain cases found in 
his motel room and allowed the search of the cases); United 
States v. Colbert. 474 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1973) (court found 
abandonment when defendants disclaimed ownership of suitcases and 
began to walk away from them). 
11. We do not reach the issue of the voluntariness of Mr. 
Marshall's consent to the search of the car, the trunk, or the 
suitcases because we find there was no consent-in-fact to the 
search of the suitcases. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. 218 (1973) (analysis of voluntariness of consent); State 
v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (state did 
not sustain its burden to prove defendants consent was 
voluntary). 
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